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Abstract 
This paper explores the bias and manipulation of the Western mass media during the Gulf wars of 1991 and 
2003. The tactics of compliance and the ethics of the press and journalists are examined. The need for a 
pluralist press is extolled.  
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INTRODUCTION 
It is assumed that in a liberal democracy the citizenry should be informed of the activities of its government so it 
can be accountable for them. Without an ability to know the actions of its representatives a true democracy 
cannot work as informed discussion cannot function effectively. This is the remit of a free press, which is 
charged with the responsibility of ensuring the populace is informed in a way that it is sometimes critical of the 
establishment. In a liberal democracy, the media should not be a tool of the government but an arbiter of it. It 
should provide as wide a view of the context of social and political issues as it can. Whilst individuals have the 
power to disseminate opinion and critiques of government policy and actions, they do not have equal power; 
therefore the balance of ‘information power’ should reside with a comparably influential independent third party 
that is, the mass media. The need for an informed population is especially pertinent in times of war where the 
need for national security and freedom of information tend to clash. This paper explores the ethical implications 
of the depiction of state violence in defence of national security using the examples of the 1991 Gulf War and 
the 2003 invasion of Iraq (the Second Iraq War) to illustrate the dilemmas posed in these situations. It will be 
argued that the media reneged on its responsibilities by neglect in the first case and by complicity with Allied 
governments and their own business interests in the second. The subtext in this paper is that the media in a 
democracy should give to the public the full range of options and opinions on a topic to allow informed opinion 
to develop. The press should be investigative and independent. If this cannot be achieved by individual media 
entities then there should be an accessible range of outlets that have enough philosophical diversity to produce 
the same effect.  
THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE MEDIA IN WAR 
During times leading up to or during conflict the media has a responsibility to inform the public in a way that 
allows them to make a rational judgement about government actions. However, most of the rhetoric at these 
times tends to be propagandistic and combative in nature.  Kovarik (2006) describes an alternative journalistic 
style that avoids blaming people, or focusing only on the suffering of one group and asks questions that make 
uncover common ground. This approach was also promulgated by Chomsky (1994) who stated that there was a 
need for the media to propose peaceful choices and highlight the implications of war rather than just the more 
binary propagandistic approach. As well as the approach to presenting news, the integrity of journalists and 
media outlets reporting it should be maintained. Some reporters such as Anderson (1993) believe that the ‘truth’ 
must be told despite the consequences, whilst others such as Bell (1998) argue that, whilst he was trained to 
believe in objective, balanced and dispassionate reporting, this is was no longer his opinion and adds that, apart 
from the ‘truth’, reporting should also be principled. The implication of his argument is that a subjective, moral 
angle should be included. Ward (1998) counters this view with one that states that reporters must not be 
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moralising but dispassionate in the sense that preconceptions, interests, or passions must not bias their 
journalistic output.  
THE MEDIA AND THE TWO GULF WARS 
With these principles in mind, the behaviour of the media during the two Iraq Wars did not display balanced, 
dispassionate, or objective coverage of the violence taking place but one that supported a specific perspective of 
the ruling elite. The argument for this opinion is outlined below. In these two conflicts, the Allied governments 
and the military used tactics to frame the news so that the public were kept unaware of the reality of the fighting 
and its context.  The tactic used by the military to control public perceptions in the Gulf War of 1991 was to 
form official ‘press pools’ through which all relevant information flowed. In the 2003 Iraq war, the information 
was filtered through ‘embedded’ reporters, vetted by the military, and then censured by the media outlets. 
Emotion and strong symbolism were used by the media with regular abandon in both wars. Before the invasion 
of Kuwait in 1991, a weeping teenager (later to found to be a relative of an influential Iraqi exile) claimed that 
she had seen Iraqi soldiers throwing  babies to the floor so they could transport the cribs back to Iraq – a potent 
and strong image designed to instil fury against Iraq (Knightley 2000). In 2003, key symbols were again used 
with the televising of the rescue of Jessica Lynch. Brown (2004) says these key symbols were used to “make 
grown men and women kill” (ibid, p.81) and the rescue of Lynch was “literally pregnant with meaning among 
the universe of symbols that are part of a grand narrative” (ibid, p.81). The reality of both situations was far 
removed from the reporting of them. In both these cases the media outlets took on board the official version of 
events on face value. With a little research, they could have exposed them as falsehoods. Of course, war always 
produces propaganda, but in both these wars the lack of questioning of official pronouncements by the news 
media was astounding. There was little media dissent from the interpretive framework provided by the 
government (Entman and Page 1994). The presentation of sanitized images was prevalent, whilst reporters were 
fed a plethora of spin terms and techno-specific images. Weapons and technology became the heroes and their 
consequences forgotten. As reporters were not allowed anywhere near any fighting, the media concentrated on 
‘sexy’ weapons. Despite around the clock media coverage, it still lacked substance and came entirely from the 
perspective of the military that controlled both the content and the context. The media corporations, mostly 
CNN in this case, seemed complicit in this management of public perception by the authorities.  The BBC took 
on its government’s view entirely and even went to the ridiculous lengths of banning the playing of songs such 
as Killing Me Softly with your Song, Everyone Wants to Rule the World, and We Can Work It Out (Taylor 1992, 
p.24). Such actions do not indicate a free and fair press but one which was conscious of ensuring continued 
support for the war, or at least, not wanting to assist in producing antagonism to the official government line. Of 
course, in war the news media is partially a tool of government but it is problematic whether the media should 
be totally compliant and by doing so hide the implications of government policy.  
This supportive media framework for the military also existed in the 2003 war, and so there was little need for 
the government or military to enforce too many controls as much of the censoring was carried by the editors and 
media owners anyway (Schechter 2005). Nevertheless, in both wars the military did set up systems to control 
the information flow to and from reporters. In both, only ‘licensed’ reporters were privy to official battlefield 
knowledge: ‘pool’ reporters in 1991 and ‘embeds’ in 2003. These ‘official’ reporters were treated less severely 
than independent ‘unilaterals’. In fact, there is some evidence that these independent and non-controlled 
reporters were deliberately targeted by the military (Anon 2003a). An Australian Government report (Miskin et 
al. 2003) quotes Kat Adie who claims that the Pentagon was “entirely hostile to the free spread of information” 
and that they have gone so far as to bomb areas in which reporters are trying to get to the Iraqi side. Independent 
journalists were explicitly told that their press status meant little and they were to be treated as ordinary civilians 
with all the risks that this implies. A notable feature in both conflicts was the compliance of mainstream media 
chiefs and their reporters to this change in the accepted status of journalists. In 1991, pool reporters surrendered 
to their military minders and accepted the multimedia presentations without question, reporting the wonders of 
the technology to the detriment of the meaning of the conflict. The media became very patriotic in the first Iraq 
war, and the reporters themselves started to criticize and denigrate non-pool reporters. When any negative story 
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was written such as some reports about the bombing of a civilian shelter at Ameriyya, the ‘patriotic’ reporters 
gave these ‘unilaterals’ labels such as “disgraces to their country”, “barbarians”, “friends of terrorists”, 
“appeasers” and “apologists for a dictator” (MacArthur 1993, p.159). This is hardly the response of a 
dispassionate press trying to seek out and expose the ‘truth’.  Such was the competition for ‘pool’ spots that 
journalists spent so much time fighting with each other that “they were unable to mount an effective opposition 
to the system” (Knightley 2000, p.490). For some journalists, the right to the privileges of the pool and its rules 
had made them forget the reason they were there: to inform the public.  The consequence of this was that the 
public were only fed the information that the military wished to be released. 
In the second Iraq war, the system of embedding reporters produced compliance from the reporters in a different 
way. Like the first Iraq war, all embedded reporters were selected by the military, and known or potential 
‘troublemakers’ were excluded. However, by embedding the reporters with the troops the reporters became their 
own censors, even so there was still a vetting process by operational officers. The experience of sleeping, eating, 
and moving with a group of soldiers naturally bound the reporter to that group. The reporters became a part of 
the teams they were in. As such, they owed loyalty to those soldiers but, more importantly, saw the world only 
from their perspective. This was not the only problem with embedding. As the reporters only saw localized fire-
fights at most, their reports could not reflect the ‘big picture’ needed to understand the context and larger issues 
of the war. Despite embedding, little footage of the actual fighting was ever presented to the public (Fiedman 
2003).  
As stated above, there was little difference in the output of different media outlets and their general support of 
the establishment view during the wars. However, there was an enormous difference in the context in which 
these two wars were fought. If the first Iraq war was the first television war (Carruthers 2000), the second could 
be called the first Internet war (Schwartz 2004). Television coverage was ubiquitous but highly controlled in 
both wars but the Internet was not. Although the Internet was not functionally a player in the 1991 war, it was 
present in 2003. Email and ‘blogging’ made their first tentative steps as an alternative source of news: certainly a 
more direct source of news but just as prone to bias and deception as conventional mechanisms. The second Iraq 
war saw the phenomenon of a competitive mass broadcaster in Al Jazeera. This station gave an Arab perspective 
to the war and although not widely seen in the West, it was thorn in the side of Western propagandists as it 
presented a different worldview of the conflict (Al-Arian 2004). Subsequent to the 2003 invasions, Arab based 
television stations using satellites and the Internet as a vehicle provided another source of information for the 
conflict in Iraq. The consequence of this is that the messages coming out of Western outlets have been 
moderated. 
Whilst there was significant public opposition to the 1991 war in the US and Europe, the second war had global 
dissent. For instance, on February 15th 2003, an estimated 10 million people in 600 cities around the world 
marched against the impending war in Iraq. For unknown reasons these marches were largely ignored or 
downplayed by the mainstream media who only made passing reference to them. The obvious mass objections to 
the coming war made no change to the press coverage; the media was more interested in selling the 
establishment’s message than reporting the news (Mantilla 2003). In fact, the demonstrations made little effect 
on policy as governments in Australia, the UK, Italy, and Spain carried on regardless – all with the tacit support 
of an unquestioning mainstream media. 
The fact that the 2003 war came after the events of 9/11 also changed the behaviour of the media and its 
reporters (Anon 2003b).  Whilst the reporting in the 1991 war was patriotic (as it is in most wars), the changed 
context of the post 9/11 war made media outlets and reporters very nervous about writing negative pieces that 
were in any way anti-government. There was a feeling that any negative commentaries would have been 
commercial and professional suicide especially in those nations with combat troops in Iraq.  This was especially 
true in the United States. Thus, any dissenting voices tended to be ignored or ridiculed: they were associated with 
treachery. 
 
A COMPLIANT MEDIA 
It is interesting to question why was there so little antagonism between the media and the establishment despite 
the large amount of dissent amongst the general public. In both wars, the military had kept the information flow 
controlled and censored. In both wars, little substantive information came out (much as happened with the 
British press in the Falklands War). However, during the 2003 war the mass media did not seem interested in 
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news per se.  It had become a profit and people seeking industry (Adie 2004). In this environment, the 
entertainment value of the news was all that was desired rather than its accuracy or depth. Mass media sponsors 
did not want news that disturbed their viewers, and so broadcasters such as Fox International were more than 
willing to support the ‘national cause’ and develop news broadcasts that were little more than very professional 
and entertaining propaganda. 
The idea of embedding was not new but it did come out of the dissatisfaction of the pool system in the first Iraq 
war. A paper published in the military journal Parameters (McLane 2004) evaluates the embedding of reporters 
and its history. It is quite positive about the experiment and claims that the ‘embeds’ enriched reporting. 
Although it does comment that the reporters were compromised by their relationships with the troops, and also 
that their reports were too narrow. However, it claims that this process demonstrates a trend toward greater 
media-military cooperation, and that the media will have to have access to future military operations to reach a 
greater understanding of war operations. However, this is antagonistic to the media’s function of dispassionately 
commenting on military actions. 
McLane (ibid) does acknowledge that whilst there is a need to conceal military strength, locations and intent, this 
might conflict with the journalist’s wish to report what is seen and heard. It critiques the press pools of the first 
Iraq war and says that the restrictions imposed by them were a form of indirect censorship. McLane claims that 
both the media and military units were pleased with embedding in the 2003 war, although there is some criticism 
of the ‘Stockholm Syndrome’. Whilst McLane felt comfortable with the limitations of embedding such as the 
narrow frame of reference and subjectivity in reporting, many other commentators felt that embedding was just 
another way of limiting public access to information. Some lament that despite embedding, no visuals of any 
substance were shown of the fighting (Fiedman 2003). In other words, embedding did not deliver its stated 
potential. Even if the reports had been accurate, they only showed small slices of censored reality. Feldman 
comments that “it may have provided the Pentagon with exactly what it wanted” (ibid, p.29). An Australian 
Government report (Miskin et al. 2003) published before the 2003 war flagged that the likelihood of camaraderie 
between the journalists and the troops would likely corrupt the reports sent back. Thus, embedding was a 
combination of sensible precautions in a theatre of war, and an effective means of censorship by making the 
journalist totally dependant on the military. From the military worldview, embedding was a success; the loser 
was in depth and accurate reporting. 
Lack of access to the battle fields in any meaningful way and the aggressive stance taken with ‘unilaterals’, and 
foreign stations such as Al Jazeera, stunted the quality of reporting of these conflicts. In an age of instantaneous 
electronic communications, this was a phenomenal achievement accomplished by strict censorship and a pro-
establishment, perception management campaign run by the mainstream, Western mass media. In cooperation 
with the military, it succeeded in keeping the public ignorant of the real situation. 
In all this, the media were either willing conspirators or negligently compliant. In an effort to curry favour with 
the ruling elites (of which the media owners were part), the press and television coverage was designed to 
influence rather than inform. This worked very well from the government and military perspective but was 
detrimental to impartial journalism. News had become entertainment and the media corporations had become 
compliant pawns of government. The extreme xenophobic nature of some of Fox Television’s reporting did not 
lead to rational information being imparted to the public (Greenwald 2004). Whilst ‘militainment’ had developed 
in the 1991 war, it was developed into a fine art by 2003. The excesses of Fox News were not just the narrow 
censorship and jingoism of 1991 but a new form of propaganda that merged computer graphics and 
entertainment; reality and fiction were merged into one. The news had primarily become ‘infotainment’ where 
the information was short and stimulating but lacking in context and depth. Programmes were predominantly 
presented in ‘episodic’ rather than ‘thematic’ form (Inyengar and Simon 1994). It is a strange fact that a research 
project found that the more television coverage Americans watched, the more misperceptions they had about the 
real situation (Kull et al. 2003). Thus, the control function of the Fourth Estate seems to have been subverted to 
the detriment of public understanding. It had ceased to stimulate debate and had become a watchdog without a 
bark. 
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CONCLUSION 
The media had an enormous impact on the public interpretation of events in the two wars discussed. Their 
behaviour surfaced many issues such as the conflict between the political needs of the leaders and operational 
security of the military, and the need for an informed public. At a lower level was the practice of the media to 
censor items not because of security issues but to protect the public’s sensibilities. So for instance, the 
beheading of a hostage by terrorists would be stopped just before any offensive material would be shown. Smith 
(2007) argues that this can be done to maintain our illusions rather than our sensibilities. He quotes Martin Bell 
as maintaining that the television coverage of the war in Bosnia was “as close to reality as a Hollywood action 
movie.” (ibid, p.2). Anderson (1993) argues that often much of this sensitive material should be shown despite 
the consequences and that the press should not censor itself. This is very relevant in the discussion of the 
coverage of the two Iraq wars which were sanitized and combat represented in glowing terms. Smith (2007) 
notes that in modern war, the reality is not like a movie and that on the battlefield the mortally wounded do not 
keep still.  It is a mute point that it could be considered unethical not to present the cruel actuality of the 
situation to the public. 
Perhaps the most fundamental danger to the ethical coverage of state violence is the progressive use by 
governments of influence campaigns prevalent in both these wars. The strategy of denial (the blocking of 
information to withhold the truth) and deception (an attempt to make someone believe something is not true) is 
becoming a favoured practice by governments (Godson and Wirtz 2002). These practices have developed in 
sophistication, and need equally clever journalists and media owners to counter them. In the two wars discussed, 
denial was almost complete in 1991 and so was deception in 2003 (with the complicity of media owners). The 
ethical responsibilities of the media were shunned and evaded in both wars. 
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